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Abstract 
It is utmost importance the high level of security while ensuring safety and trusted 
communications between organizations. Network security always was suffering from 
lack of resources, while intruder’s knowledge is one step ahead. It seems that we are 
developing code by testing which is neither wrong nor right rather than testing by 
development. Based on this fact an IDS system would achieve better efficiency and 
effectiveness if it was designed by a hacker. APT threats are not new threats, instead 
are old threats that redeployed with advance knowledge on protocols. APT threats does 
not pose intelligence on the code itself, rather than on the methodologies they use to 
keep their appearance almost unknown through a system and their persistency to 
identify a system or application vulnerability.  
Present thesis acts as guidance in order to setup an IDS and evaluate its results. Part of 
this guidance is to investigate existing IDS systems behavior. We analyze both the types 
of intrusion detection systems HIDS – NIDS and identify main fundamental 
components of APT/AVT threats. This thesis aims in transforming already documented 
security policy into Zeek rules against live network traffic. 
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1 Introduction 
Cyber security has been a major awareness the last few years as intrusions have been 
more sophisticated by using complex methodologies. Internet technologies and 
communications has grown at an explosive rate in contrast to security systems and 
policies that has not progressed as rapidly. While the internet has been acting as a 
mediator for spreading communications and information around the global, it has also 
made easier the attacks on computer systems attached to it resulting more advanced 
requirements in order to implement a network security system. There many factors 
that needs to be concerned as most intrusions are a combination of connectionless 
based threats (virus, works, phishing etc.) and connection-oriented intrusions DoS 
attacks.   
Other factors demanding further consideration include: complexity of networks, 
rapidly increase of methodologies and techniques used by intruders on applications 
and attacks as well as financial benefits with the inception of Phishing attacks. 
Furthermore these factors highlight the increasing need for the organizations and 
government to protect their networks assets by using advanced Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS). 
1.1 Defining an APT and its intentions 
Traditional threats are still posing a major concern for organizations, a challenge that 
can’t be ignored. Additionally, new challenges menace the organizations and 
governments, dealing with the Advanced Persistent Threats (aka. APT). This 
terminology was firstly generated as a code name in order to describe Chinese 
intrusions aiming to exploit critical information in a stealthy way from US military 
organizations. Advance persistent threats are focused, stealthy and targeted attacks, 
aiming specific critical information and covering their tales very carefully which 
makes them to deviate from traditional viruses or worms and also very difficult to be 
detected by traditional security measures.  
Main characteristics of an APT include [9]: 
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• APT is not focusing on special organizations but rather they focus on any 
organization both government and commercial. 
• Once the APT breaks into the system, it is very intelligent in what it does and 
the way that does it. It can be changed, recompile its code on the fly and 
remain stealth in order to avoid being detected.  
• Because APT attacks are function in a stealth mode, this increases the risk of a 
compromisation 
• APT uses advanced tools and methods in order to increase speed of the 
malicious activities. Automation is not the only fact that causes the persistency 
of the threat, but also what the method that allows intruders to act fast.  
• APTs are not newly developed threats, but are old well known threats 
encapsulated with advanced techniques in order both to speed up their 
malicious functionality and confuse detection systems.  
• APT mainly focuses in providing the intruder with specific benefits such as 
economic or financial gains. Anything that is important for its value to the 
attacked organization is also important to the attacker too.  
• Persistency of an APT is the mainly issue meaning that APTs are designed 
that way to stay for long-term in an organization. Acquiring data for once may 
be beneficial for the attacker, but being persistent for long-term is more 
beneficial.    
1.2 Intro to Zeek 
Zeek is an open-source domain specific language, normally referred as a scripting 
platform that is designed to work with network traffic. Zeek itself does not constitute 
an IDS system, beside that it provides several useful features for protocol analysis as 
well as a lot of out of the box functionalities for basic analysis tasks including 
protocol decoding, logging and notifications for common security events. Even 
though Zeek differs from other intrusion detection systems such as Snort or Suricata, 
it also poses a complimentary method to these systems. While Snort language is well 
functioning in identifying bytes in a network flow, Zeek poses the best option for 
more complex tasks including those that require higher-level protocol knowledge, 
cross functional network flows, or custom patterns when needed to identify specific 
information in the traffic [13]. 
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One of its fundamental assets is that it can identify well known and unknown 
protocols even if running on non-standard ports using Dynamic Protocol Detection 
(DPD) feature. Zeek protocol logging is fully customizable, and while parsing or 
decoding it gives the users the ability to create custom logic for processing the 
transactions in the network traffic that is under examination. The actions taken by a 
protocol are treated as a series of events, for which custom handlers can be written. Its 
analysis mechanism includes both signature-based detection and anomaly-based 
detection for such events that pose unusual behavior. Upon detection of something of 
interest Zeek can be instructed to alert the operator in real-time, generate logs that can 
be used later for forensics, or even execute an operating system command with 
CronTab daemon (e.g. to block a host or terminate a connection).    
Zeek is an anomaly-based intrusion detection system that matches the identified 
network traffic packets with the custom application profile. A notice would raise in 
case multiple unsuccessful attempts are triggered by a user within a short period of 
time, or above a predefined threshold against an application (e.g. FTP, SSH). Most 
often signature-based systems are tricked while the attacker can sneak through by 
using special characters or variety of encoding methods. This is unlikely to happen 
with Zeek anomaly-detection system, because it gives the operator the authority to use 
custom patterns for detecting nonnative characters [13].  
1.3 Purpose of this Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to deploy a documented network security policy, into Zeek 
rules against live network traffic events through anomaly-based detection techniques 
in order to produce an unsupervised detection system.  
1.4 Research question 
Computer and network security technologies are still in the beginning as firewalls, 
antivirus/antimalware and intrusion detection systems have migrated from research 
labs into active defense of both organizational and commercial networks. Both 
computer and network security systems are composed mostly of complex devices and 
in order to succeed their functionality certain conflicting goals has to be matched (e.g. 
high performance, easy administration and fault tolerance). Based on this there are 
vendors implementing systems either based on cost, speed or even how satisfied are 
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the protection results find by other users so it gets even more difficult for the 
customer to determine which product is best on what is says it does.  
As new vulnerabilities emerge on a daily bases it gets complex and cost consuming to 
patch all of them, given that there are cases that a vulnerability can be exposed after 
causing considerably large amount of damage. Appropriate detection technology can 
eliminate such incidents. Based on that we are implementing an anomaly-based real-
time intrusion detection system. As mentioned previously above, anomaly-based 
intrusion systems differ in many ways than signature-based, but can be also used as 
complimentary for additional protection. One of the main challenges while 
developing such a system, is the ability to adequately distinguish abnormal behavior 
from normal behavior as this could be a caveat when generating notices in network 
traffic.  
1.5 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 provides a technical background as a bases for the research of this thesis. 
Anomaly-based detection method is detailed in extend by presenting related work that 
has already been done both for data mining and machine learning techniques and 
advanced statistical anomaly technique.    
Chapter 3 issues the related literature that this thesis is based on. Differences of 
intrusion detection systems vs intrusion prevention systems are identified. An 
extensive description is presented both on HIDS and NIDS systems along with 
advantages and disadvantages of detection methodologies. A detailed description is 
also provided on APT and AVT threats distinguishing its fundamental components. 
Furthermore an introduction to Zeek scripting platform is presented and its 
accompany functionalities.  
Chapter 4 provides a detailed description based on our idea to deploy a network 
security policy into an IDS system. A university network security policy has been 
implemented and taken as a base for the designed policies of our detection system. 
Chapter 5 introduces the Zeek security policy scripts designed to cover most of the 
aspects of the IHU Network security policy. Contains Zeek code snip sets along with 
verification results.  
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Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarizing our contribution and propositions of 
several ideas for future work implementation. 
Appendices contain Zeek log files, the full code of the implemented policy scripts and 
also IHU Network Security Policy documentation. 
2 Relevant Work 
2.1 Anomaly-based intrusion detection methods 
Any security breach incident poses in danger both computer systems and humans, 
such as an intrusion that points on services performance, system manipulation as well 
as unauthorized access to susceptible information. Several techniques have been 
applied over the past years in order to obstruct security breaches but due to constant 
expansion of the internet and precisely to the new technologies that arise, detection 
tends to be even more complicated. A fully-fledged anomaly-based intrusion 
detection system is composed of many provocations since the network traffic is both 
dynamic and complex making it more unrealistic to distinguish between abnormal 
from normal traffic. Network-based intrusion detection systems (aka. NIDS) are 
divided into traffic and application systems relying on the information is used to 
detect the anomaly [5]. In literature, several approaches have been proposed for 
network anomaly detection consisting of Data mining/machine learning anomaly 
detection and advanced statistical anomaly detection [23]. 
2.1.1 Data mining/machine learning method 
Data mining acquire methods are used to detect and form user’s behavior during or 
after a campaign based on a set of rules and patterns, or by simply linking several 
events together. Data mining is be composed of four main categories: 1) can be used 
to predict the state of network traffic at a certain time yielding the security experts to 
control specific areas where abnormal activity is identified, 2) extracted patterns from 
captured data can be used to identify the existence of a given event, or activity, 3) 
captured data can be partitioned resulting in distinguishing the classes or the 
categories derive from combined sets of parameters and 4) can be used as 
enhancements of resources in several concepts. As an example the evaluation of 
software quality in regard to software faults can be daunting, unless data mining 
 14 
techniques in combination with information from several software metrics are 
gathered [2, 6]. This technique necessitates that the each data sets are labeled, leading 
the detection process error-prone, pricey and prolonged [23]. 
Alternatively machine learning detection method assembles the required models 
(characteristics of know attacks) automatically. This detecting process requires less 
human interference and have achieved fairly positive results so far although there is 
still a large number of faced crucial challenges; security of the process, failure of 
learning the algorithms due to mismatch in the data and insufficient capability of 
detecting previously unknown attacks due to significant big number of false alerts 
[23]. 
Trend Micro security researchers Villeneuve, N. and Bennett, J. [58] focusing on 
analysis of an APT by extracting attackers mistakes through careful monitoring and 
investigation of ongoing campaigns in huge volumes of network traffic analysis. The 
optimum aim is to get a brief look into spiteful operations by relying on a scheme of 
both contextual and technical indicators. While APT activities will keep altering its 
patterns, a significant number of ongoing campaigns can still be detected with the aid 
of network indicators and network patterns modifications.  
DExtor [35, 36] is a data mining based exploit code detector tool that can be deployed 
inside the network between a server and a firewall to protect network servers. Its 
technique consists both benign and exploit traffic resulting in extracting several 
features from the training instances in order to construct feature vendors. Both the set 
of instructions and their frequency contribute in identifying whether the traffic is 
normal or an intrusion. However deploying the tool in large networks is irrational 
since its efficiency only applies for 42Kb/sec of network traffic. 
Jasek et al. [28] use honeypots as an enhanced security system solution (honeypot 
agent) in order to detect APT by directing an attacker to the system without disclose 
the implemented security measurements. Honeypots are designed to behave like a 
complete operating system in order to distract an attacker. It is used to log access 
attempts on ports and attacker’s keystrokes. It doesn’t result any value therefore 
anything goes to or from a honeypot acts as a probe. Honeypots collect high value 
small data sets as with their usage reduce false negatives and repels new attacks as 
they work under encrypted and IPv6 environments [22, 6]. Honeypot environments by 
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their nature are passive systems holding fake contents where an attacker can access 
sensitive information or use it as a pivot in order to compromise other systems 
resulting, various major limitations that direct an attacker to continue its activities in 
stealth mode [46, 6]. 
Diwan et al. [14] proposes a hybrid approach, a blend of K-Medoids clustering and 
Naϊve-Bays classification for intrusion detection. Naϊve-Bays classification implicates 
many features that are not divided between normal operations and anomalies. A 
combination of Naϊve-Bays classification with modified clustering data mining 
techniques are used to extract patterns that present normal behavior aiming to enhance 
accuracy and efficiency of the results. Sets of naϊve-Bays classification rules are 
classified as normal behavior and the combination with modified clustering data will 
clarify the anomalous behavior.  
Brogi et al. [5] developed an APT detection tool that is capable of highlighting 
attacker’s trails during an intrusion campaign by using IFT services.  This approach 
aims to use the outcome of the steps of an APT pattern (reconnaissance, delivery, 
exploitation, operation, data collection and data exfiltration) in order to link them 
together and identify the leaked information between the attacked elements. One 
caveat of this system is that the APT detector was not executed in real time, during an 
ongoing attack instead of identifying the attacker steps after the attack was executed. 
Bereziński et al. [4] approach uses an entropy-based method in identifying botnets 
based on anomalous patterns. Such type of anomalies are normally hidden in the 
network traffic in a form of flows, packets or bytes making the detection even harder. 
This approach aims to prove that entropy-based method applicable to detect modern 
botnets. The implementation of the proposed method named Anode consists of two 
phases: training phase where a normal traffic profile is build and detection phase in 
which current traffic is compared to the normal model. A limitation of this approach 
is that parameterization of the entropy causes inefficiency to detect low-rate 
anomalies.      
2.1.2 Advanced statistical anomaly method  
Statistical anomaly detection method utilizes statistical models in order to distinguish 
‘abnormal traffic’ from ‘normal traffic’ by formulating a user’s profiling of regular 
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behavior. This way an anomaly is detected when current user's behavior deviates from 
the stored profile. Limitations of using this technique are; the distribution of the data 
across the network are considered conjectural and that they pose inefficiency to large 
datasets or datasets with large attributes [41]. 
A Chi-square testing-based intrusion detection model utilizes Chi-Square statistics in 
detecting Network based intrusions [1]. This system be composed of 3 levels; during 
the first level TCP flags are extracted from each packet and four categories of RST, 
SYN-ACK, ICMP and other TCP packets are produced and the total number of 
packets per second for each category is calculated. In second level, a sample 
distribution is produced and calculated by the chi-square against the captured data 
producing the chi-square value that will be used to the next level. At decision phase 
an intrusion/alarm is raised when the chi-square value of the sample distribution is 
greater than the value of the tabulated chi-square value.  Such an anomaly detection 
system lacks of efficiency and performance in large scaled networks. 
Koutsandria et al. [30] approach is based on detecting intrusions on networks 
supporting hybrid controllers that implement power grid protection systems. The aim 
is to transform the communication rules that physical devices utilize such as micro-
processor based controllers and packet-switched communications into a Hybrid 
Control NIDS system (HC-NIDS). Such a system is consisted of three phases; In the 
first phase overcurrent protection function is used in order to protect the physical 
processes of the system such circuit breakers, sensors etc. for master and slave 
controllers. The second phase consists of an S-function block that is responsible to 
formulate the sensor measurements and reply to the master controller query with 
Modbus packets. For the third phase a Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC acting as the 
master controller for overcurrent protection function is used. A communication 
between the master controller and the slave relay is established and the sensor 
measurements received by the current sensors are obtainable. At this point the 
protection control algorithm is executed where the master controller sends “write” 
queries to the slave relay expecting which control action will be performed. The 
limitations of this approach is that Power Grid systems often consists of many 
components that coordination in order for the whole system to be protected tends to 
be inadequate and time consuming. Furthermore IDS rules needs to be customized for 
each application/component separately with different settings. 
 17 
Luh et al. [33] proposes a system that captures anomalous behavior in a 
communication session by examining irregularities in a predefined set of process 
graphs.  Anomalies are distributed and unscrambled by using a semantic decision tree 
combined with targeted attack ontology. Obtained data comprise several monitored 
devices along with transmitted and translated kernel events are stored in a database. 
These events are transformed in simple graphs that illustrate the handled operation 
from each process in a dedicated time period. Anomalies are detected by observing 
the distance in between these graphs. However such an approach needs further 
investigation to enhance the decision trees and improve the automation of the 
mapping process. 
Krugel et al. [31] present a system that utilizes concrete knowledge of the network 
services that needs to be protected from intrusion. Simple network traffic models form 
an application model that is capable of detecting malicious content in network 
packets. The aim of using service specific anomaly detection is to include the 
application payload within the rest of the packet header information. In order the 
payload of packets to be processed the network traffic is partitioned and separately 
analysis of packets sent by several applications takes place. Therefore with service 
specific anomaly detection statistical data can be collected irreproachable establishing 
a normal traffic for each service. This system uses a training period that is definable 
by the user, to read packets from the network and captured data are split into service 
specific traffic and a profile of each service is build. Detection of anomaly is achieved 
by comparing the new traffic with the created profile. 
SPARTA [31] is a system that detects security policy violations and intrusions in 
heterogeneous network environments. SPARTA is relies in a proprietary language to 
demonstrate campaigns. The aim of this detection system is to correlate events that 
occur anywhere in the network and a pattern of presenting these events. Is composed 
of 4 phases; a local sensor, an event storage mechanism, an independent agent 
platform and a fourth optional unit of a user interface. Nevertheless such a proposed 
solution has several drawbacks; multiple components are used which raises the risk of 
an intrusion, events of unlike nodes that depend on an instance of a single event in a 
third node are indefinable. 
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3 Related Theory 
3.1 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
In a nutshell, intrusion detection is the operation of monitoring events that befall in a 
computer system or a network and the identification for evidence of possible incidents 
being part of violations or impeding threats of computer security policies, or standard 
security practices. An intrusion detection system (IDS) refers to actual software that 
automates this process. The root of an incident may be a probe, a privilege escalation 
attack, DDoS attack, a malware, a routing attack or even internal unauthorized access 
due to misuse of users account privileges. An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is 
exactly the same as an IDS that only differs in the configuration of the system. A key 
point of an IPS in regard to an IDS is that, if they detect an ongoing intrusion, the 
detected activity is banned as malicious. Whatever the case is, intrusions are detected 
due to a predefined set of rules. IDS solutions are capable of having over time an 
updated framework without the need to modify the core software package preserving 
their resilience up against new security threats [49, 57].  
 
Figure 1 Comparison of an IDS to IPS [27] 
 
An intrusion detection system identifies intrusion attempts, whereas an intrusion 
prevention system stop intruders before getting even deeper on the system, an action 
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that the firewall supposed to do at first place. The comparison of an intrusion 
detection system and a firewall gets very vague regarding their functions, as their 
functionality is similar up to a point that IDS uses a bit more intelligence. As an 
example, it is not a regular situation for a firewall to allow traffic on port 22 (ssh) and 
block traffic when detecting any malicious patterns. The difference between an 
intrusion detection system and a firewall is the ability of perception of flags and 
options as parts of packet headers and data, instead of checking IP addresses and ports 
[29]. 
An intrusion detection system be composed of three logical components: 
• Sensors or Agents are accountable for collecting data that contain evidence of 
an intrusion. These input data may be network packets, log files and system 
call traces. 
• Analyzers are diagnose whether an intrusion occurred based on input from 
sensors or other analyzers. In most circumstances the analyzer can provide the 
actions to be taken in case an intrusion has occurred. 
• User Interface enables a user or an administrator to both view and control the 
system. Depending on the usage of the console, some are used only to 
configure sensors or agents and apply software updates while other for 
monitoring and analysis [49, 52].  
Modern intrusion detection and prevention systems have the ability to handle high 
load networks supporting at least two detection methods. Additionally they are 
enhanced with new methods of anomalous detection based on artificial intelligent 
algorithms, maintaining their efficiency on detecting unknown attacks. 
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Figure 2 IDS using AI and Machine Learning Algorithm [19, 45] 
3.1.1 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are many subclasses of an intrusion detection systems, depending the needs of 
each proposed architecture and the types of events are capable of recognizing as well 
as the used methodologies to identify possible incidents. For the purpose of this 
document only the most important once are mentioned. These are host intrusion 
detection systems (HIDS) and network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).   
3.1.1.1 Host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) 
A host-based intrusion detection system is installed only on a single host deemed to 
be prone to possible attacks and monitors the system from internal or external threats. 
A host-based system can obtain data from several sources such as system logs, logs 
generated by the O/S processes, audit and logging methods stored in a single text file. 
HIDS depend mostly on audit trails (collected data about events) leading to 
limitations, that were not part of the detection system itself. That way in order to 
maintain effectiveness of host-based systems the developer needs to modify the 
existing O/S kernel code to produce event information an approach that results 
conflicts with other applications, therefore increases inefficiency of the system.  
Audit trails are considered to be very handy to host-based systems despite their 
limitations, both for users and system itself since the main aim of O/S is to protect the 
audit layer as well as for the level of detail that audit trails provide that is remarkably 
important when analyzing attack patterns. For example, the host-based sensor is 
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capable of recovering the process that initiated an event as well as the user associated 
with that event. Such information are critical in determining the root of cause of a 
possible attack.  
The main drawback of host-based systems is the amount of data that they accumulate, 
as the more data the more accurate the detection is, but this also requires additional 
amounts of space due to the fact that real amounts of data on these used systems are 
vast. Additionally such amounts of data and the complexity of processing these 
information slow down the whole system. A burden that designers and analysts must 
overcome so that host-based sensors maintain their effectiveness and avoid becoming 
cumbersome [40, 28, 11].  
Host-based systems are preferable for several reasons such as the ability of gathering 
information in terms of “who accessed and what” leading them to trace malicious 
activity from a specific user which rises also the risk of uncertainty of user awareness. 
They also have the ability to function in encrypted environments and switched 
network topology. Host-based systems allocate the monitoring load across available 
hosts throughout a network eliminating significant costs which allows them to be 
more scalable when network traffic increases dramatically.     
An inherent limitation of host-based systems is that they are not being able of 
monitoring network traffic but to run on single host. As mentioned previously host-
based systems are heavily rely on the O/S, thus any observed vulnerabilities of the 
system will decrease the host-based sensor integrity since in a case of exploitation of 
these weaknesses would lead to an intrusion hard to identify.  
Another limitation of host-based systems is that they do not support cross-platform 
functionality, a vital impediment for corporations that wish to use host-based 
solutions and also for computer security professionals to become more educated about 
the field [40, 28, and 10].  
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Figure 3 OSSEC host-based Agent/Server configuration [25] 
 
Figure 4 Host-based intrusion detection system 
3.1.1.2 Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) 
Network-based intrusion detection systems follow a different approach in monitoring 
than host-based systems, as they examine packet traffic directed to possibly 
vulnerable computer systems on a network in real time, while host-based systems 
examine users and software activity on a dedicated host. These systems are capable of 
examining network, transport and application layer of the OSI model and mainly 
included in the perimeter security infrastructure, either integrated as part of a firewall, 
or work simultaneously with a firewall monitoring for external intrusion attempts by 
analyzing both traffic patterns and traffic content [52].  
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Network-based detection systems are portable, as they monitor network traffic on a 
specific network segment independently of the O/S they are installed on. This benefit 
increases their popularity as more businesses that run tailored software applications 
are able to use them. Furthermore network-based sensors can be easily integrated 
within the existing system while data are being collected with minimal effort [11].  
Often an IDS is located in a complete different part of the network and an entirely 
different machine than the system is monitoring, causing unconformities between the 
monitored machine and the IDS. For instance, consider an intrusion detection system 
and an end-system located at different places in a network receiving packets in 
different points of time. Assuming that something happens during the lag in time on 
the end-system and makes it incapable of receiving the packet, while the IDS already 
processed the packet and waits response from the end-system. The same applies with 
packets received with incorrect checksum resulting in reducing the systems accuracy 
[29]. 
Network-based systems are passive, meaning that they do not maintain the 
connectivity of a network in case an IDS crashes or its resources are starved due to a 
DDoS attack making it a “fail-open” system [29]. Scalability is another major 
limitation in network-based systems as they lack in managing high-speed networks or 
to retain their features with heavy traffic. A weakness that advances intruders to 
identify them and exploit them. Additional limitations of network-based systems 
concern encryption and switched networks. Encrypted packets or network protocols 
are extremely difficult to be scanned, while switched topologies pose extra obstacles 
since switches isolate network connections between hosts and therefore a host is able 
to see only traffic addressed to it [11]. 
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Figure 5 Network-based intrusion detection system 
 
Centralized network-based systems are limited by their false alerts as licit traffic can 
be blocked resulting problems for normal users. A network-based system that is 
deployed at the border of the network may be completely collapse from internal 
intrusion or a compromised internal host. On the other hand a distributed network-
based system eliminates these problems of inline deployment however limitations still 
exist, due to the fact that implementation of a distributed NIDS rely mainly on a 
client-server architecture, that is to say a stable connection between the client and the 
server tends to be infeasible when dealing with heavy traffic networks [23].    
3.1.2 Detection Methodologies 
Detection is a mechanism that parses collected data in order to generate alert data. 
Detection of data ends, when these generated data are presented to an analyst, and 
that’s where an analysis begins. An effective detection in order to be successful 
requires the appropriate detection mechanism. Several detection methodologies are 
used by intrusion detection systems, most of them are used integrated to provide more 
precise and comprehensive results. Two main types of intrusion detection techniques 
exist: signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based use patterns of known 
attacks and compare them to current traffic and when a match is found they raise an 
alert, while anomaly-based uses statistical models on ‘normal’ network traffic and any 
traffic that differs from ‘normal’ is considered anomalous based in the predefined 
model.  
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When a network infrastructure is under monitoring for potential security concerned 
incidents, an intrusion detection system can implement both anomaly and signature 
based intrusion detection methods in order to provide supreme defense. In a nutshell, 
signature-based intrusion detection method has been ordinary used more than 
anomaly-based method, when monitoring malicious activity on the network. 
Signature-based method mainly relies on a database of attack signatures, which needs 
to be updated all the time and when a match is found with a possible incident in a live 
traffic an alarm is triggered. This is clearly a major drawback considering that hackers 
spend lots of time in crafting attacks developed to mock signature-based detection 
systems [28, 49, and 48].   
 Signature-based detection Anomaly-based detection 
Advantages • High accuracy for known 
behaviors, or patterns. 
• Simple algorithms. 
• Low False alarm rate. 
• Minimal resource usage. 
• High accuracy rate on 
unknown attacks. 
• Low missing pattern rate. 
• Ability to detect user-
privilege abuse. 
• Ability to detect zero-day 
attacks. 
Disadvantages • Unable to detect unknown 
attacks. 
• Regular database updates. 
• Difficult to separate an 
attempted attack from real 
actual attack. 
• Slower detection rate. 
• Maintenance is time-
consuming. 
• Needs to be very well 
trained. 
• High false alarm rate. 
Table 1 Signature-based vs Anomaly-based detection systems 
For the purpose of this theses only anomaly-based detection technique will be 
analyzed further. 
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3.1.2.1 Anomaly-based detection 
Anomaly-based detection technique is based on predefined profiles as previously 
mentioned. A baseline profile is generated representing behavior of ‘normal’ traffic. 
In case ‘abnormal’ traffic is detected, network traffic that deviates from the ‘normal’ 
traffic which is saved in a profile then an alert is triggered warning the possible 
intrusion identified. This baseline profile which normally includes users, applications, 
hosts, and network connections is created in order for the intrusion-detection system 
to be able to collect the traffic on a period of time and then statistically observe the 
behavior of the traffic during peak/non-peak hours, over-night hours and as per 
network behavior that each organizations has defined. Tailored profiles can also be 
created for particular traffic behavioral attributes such as number of e-mails sent by a 
user, the level of processor usage by a host, the number of failed logins by a host as 
well as user access attempts all depending on how an organization deployed the 
intrusion-detection system in their network. [44, 49, 29]. 
 
Figure 6 Anomaly-based detection methodology 
  
Examples of anomalous behavior [29]: 
• HTTP traffic on a unknown port (port 53) – protocol anomaly 
• Backdoor service on well-known standard port e.g. p2p file sharing with 
Gnutella on port 80 – protocol anomaly and statistical anomaly 
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• A segment of binary code in a user password – application anomaly 
• Increased UDP traffic compared to TCP traffic – statistical anomaly 
• Increased amount of bytes receiving from an HTTP browser that is visited – 
application and statistical anomaly 
Effectiveness and efficiency of an intrusion detection system is achieved when it has 
a vigorous baseline profile which covers the entire network components and its 
segments and utilizes a custom combination of detection techniques, both anomaly 
and signature-based. An advantage of utilizing anomaly-based systems is that they 
can detect 0-day attacks even though they require a training phase to deploy the 
normal statistics database and cautious settings of threshold level of detection which 
makes them more complex.  
In order to detect anomalies accurately a profile of ‘normal’ behavior in a rule-based 
pattern matching system may contain the following components [29]: 
• Subjects and objects: subjects are the initiators of an activity in the target 
system. Normally as subject refers to a terminal user, but it might be also a 
process that is acting on behalf of users or a cluster of users or the system 
itself and is responsible for all activities that are given through commands. 
Subjects may also sorted in several clusters in order to control access to 
objects in the system. Additionally objects are the addressee of the actions and 
include entities such as files, programs, records, messages, terminals and 
created structures. In case subjects are the receptors of actions, then they 
considered as objects in the model. 
 
• Audit Records: are responses produced by the target system regarding the 
performed actions or attempted by subjects on objects-command execution, 
file access, user-login/logout, read etc. A typical form of an Audit Record 
consists the following attributes: “Subject, Action, Object, Exception-
Condition, Resource-usage, and Time-stamp”. When Audit Records are 
collected for more than one systems than additional fields are added in the 
above form. All activities are decomposed into actions so that each audit 
records points to only a single object. Decomposing actions is beneficial for 
the following reasons: 
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o Objects are the entities of a system, thus a possible detection is 
applicable using this model of both attempted subversions of the access 
and successful subversions by detecting an abnormality in the 
accessible set of objects related to the subject.  
o Keeping simple audit records simplifies the model and its operation 
o Audit records generated by existing systems generally contain a single 
object, so that files can be identified easily.  
However a handicap of audit records is that they contain a minimal descriptive 
information to identify the holding values. Each record type has a dedicated 
structure, and the same format each record must be known to interpret the 
values. Another disadvantage is that they are imperfect in terms of the 
monitored activities and the record structures that produced. 
• Profiles: Structures that describe the behavior of subjects regarding to objects 
in terms of statistical metrics and models of observed activity. Profiles are 
generated automatically and initialized from templates. For example given a 
metric for a variable “X” and its “n” observations “X1 …  Xn”, the aim of a 
statistical model of “X” is decide if the new observation “Xn+1” is anomalous 
in contrast with the previous collected values. Some well-known models are 
[42]: 
o Operation model which is based on the operational hypothesis that the 
comparison of a new observation of “X” against fixed limits can result 
abnormality. 
o Mean and Standard Deviation Model which is based on the assumption 
that all we know about “X1 … Xn” are mean and standard deviation. 
o Multivariate Model which is based on associations between two or 
more metrics. 
o Markov Process model applies only to event counters as a state 
variable and uses a state transition matrix to present the transition 
frequencies in between the states. This model also may have several 
benefits when identifying transitions between specific commands 
where a command sequence format is important.  
o Time Series Model which uses as an input an interval timer, an event 
counter, the order and interarrival of the observations “X1 …  Xn”, 
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including their values and identifies an abnormality if its probability of 
occurring is too low.  
Activity profiles is consist of information that identifies the statistical model 
and random variable metric together with the set of audit events measured by 
the variable. A profile is composed of 10 components of which the first 7 are 
irrespective of the specific subjects and objects measured in the form of: 
“Variable-Name, Action-Pattern, Exception-Pattern, Resource-Usage-Pattern, 
Period, Variable-Type, Threshold, Subject-Pattern, Object-Pattern, Value”. 
Uniquely identification of a profile is achieved by 3 objects which are 
variable-name, subject-pattern and object-pattern. All components of a profile 
are changeableness except for value.  
• Anomaly Records: are produced when abnormal behavior is detected and 
consists three components: 
o Event can be either “audit” clarifying abnormality in the data of an 
audit record, or “period” stating that accumulated data over an interval 
time was found abnormal. 
o Time-stamp can be either the time-stamp in the audit record or the 
interval end time. 
o Profile can be an activity profile presented in a form of a key record 
pointing to full profile, identifying the type of abnormality that it was 
detected. 
 
• Activity Rules: are the actions taken when certain conditions such as a 
produced audit record or anomaly record or a period of time ends are fulfilled. 
An activity rule is composed of two parts: a condition which is specified as a 
pattern-match on an event and when satisfied results the rule to be “fired” and 
a main body. Four types of rules exist: 
o Audit-record rule which sets off when a new audit record and an 
activity profile match, the profile is updated and anomalous behavior 
identifications starts.  
o Periodic-activity-update rule which sets off when the end of an 
interval and the period component of an activity profile match. 
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o Anomaly-record rule which sets off when an anomaly record is 
generated. 
o Periodic-anomaly-analysis rule which is fired by the end of an interval 
and brief reports of the anomalies during a set of period are generated. 
Newly produced audit records are compared with the profiles. Given information in 
the matching profiles defines the rules to be followed in order to update the profiles, 
examine for abnormal behavior and report the detected anomalies. The administrator 
or security expert of the system assists in profile templates construction in respect to 
monitor activities, but the rules and profile structures are system independent. The 
aim is to monitor the standard operation on a target system identifying only 
inconsistencies in usage. Rule-pattern matching system does not include any special 
features for conducting complex actions that are used to exploit security flaws in the 
target system as it has unawareness of the target system mechanisms or its blemishes. 
3.1.2.2 Types of Anomaly 
Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems protect against anomalies as a 
consequence of protocol violations, application payload, buffer overflow and Denial 
of service attacks. 
3.1.2.2.1 Protocol Anomaly 
An anomaly in protocols occurs when it poses inconsistencies both in the format and 
the protocol and in its behavior in comparison to the internet standards and 
specifications (RFCs). TCP/IP composes many features to be monitored such as 
different flags, SYN/ACK and FIN, TCP header combinations as well as IP header 
reserved flags. IP decomposition and reassembly is implemented base on the 
standards. At the application layer the intrusion detection system must be capable of 
inspecting the protocols up to the point that the protocol anomaly is well identified 
and also deep understanding of application semantics in order to detect accurately 
application payload anomalies [44].  
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Figure 7 Application payload anomaly [43] 
 
 
Figure 8 TCP packets reassembly [29] 
 
All connection oriented protocols states, thus a certain event must be executed at a 
certain time period, resulting protocol anomaly detectors to be implemented as state 
machines where each state points to the correspondence part of the connection e.g. 
client/server response. Internet standards and specifications are not always complete, 
covering each aspect of a protocol, and that’s a good starting point in order to produce 
a detection model as it is easier to construct an error-free manipulation of the protocol 
than starting from the bottom up and build the model based on misuse. Additionally 
protocol anomaly detectors are capable of detecting new growing attacks based in 
RFCs protocol violations without being update in contrast to signature-based IDSs 
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which they need frequently updates in order to identify and detect such attacks [12, 
32, and 61].  
 
 
Figure 9 Protocol anomaly detection [32] 
 
The update frequency of protocol anomaly detectors is far more less than the updates 
in signature-based systems since new protocols, enhancements on existing protocols 
as well as protocol extensions will be added to the IDS in a form of protocol state 
machine. Another benefit of protocol anomaly detectors which makes them to vary 
from traditional intrusion detection systems is the way that alarms are presented to the 
system operator and that is achieved by describing the particular part of the state 
machine that was violated, which requires expert knowledge of protocol design. A 
well planned and developed protocol detector uses fewer rules to depict normal 
behavior which increases the bandwidth of operation leading to efficiency and 
effectiveness [12, 32, and 61].   
 
Some attacks can be distinguished by parsing IP packets as such an attempts of 
bypassing a packet filter can be observed by examining the fragment offset fields of 
each IP fragments. Other attacks infringe over multiple packets or decoded without 
affecting the actual protocol, e.g. a DNS query is linked to a certain host. Additionally 
in an insertion attack the attacker transmits HTTP requests puddling its contents with 
extra data to the IDS resulting the request to seem harmless. In an evasion attack the 
attacker transmits segments of the same request in packets that erroneously will be 
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rejected by the IDS, allowing to remove parts of the flow from the intrusion detection 
system’s view, e.g. transforming the original request to “GET /gin/f” which is 
something unknown to the majority of intrusion detection systems [29]. 
 
Figure 10 HTTP insertion attack [43] 
 
 
Figure 11 Insertion-evasion attack [29] 
There are many ways that an attacker can manipulate an IP packet that IDS will accept, some 
of these are:  
• Manipulation of the IP datagram header field. 
• Corrupt checksum 
• Incorrect TTL field 
• Incorrect “Don’t Fragment” flag in the IP header 
• Existence of portions of shellcode in unexpected protocol fields 
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An insertion attack has similar consequences for the link-layer addressing as an 
attacker that is located on the same LAN as the network monitor does, can direct link 
layer frames to the IDS, hiding the host specified as the IP destination to see the 
packet, unless the IDS checks the MAC address on the received packet [29].  
 
Figure 12 Insertion attack on Link Layer [29] 
3.1.2.2.2 Stateful Protocol Analysis Detection 
Stateful protocol analysis (SPA) method which is similar to anomaly-based detection 
is the process of correlating predetermined profiles of benign protocol activity for 
each protocol state according to the protocol standards against observed events to 
identify abnormality. Stateful protocol analysis relies mainly on vendor developed 
universal profiles that are defined with the rules of protocol functionality, in contrast 
to anomaly-based detection that utilizes host or network specific profiles. With this 
method the intrusion detection system is capable of maintaining track for both 
network and application layers. The TCP protocol specification (RFC793 [55]) 
describes several “states” that are included in any given connection. It is critically 
important to pair requests with responses in order to understand fully the operation of 
the “states”. In case of an authentication, the initial connection state is in an 
“unauthorized state” in which only a few commands may executed. After an exchange 
of some more information between the client and the server the user gets 
authenticated and any executed commands are considered legit.  
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Stateful protocol analysis method is capable of identifying sudden recurrence of 
commands by performing a protocol analysis to the length of the arguments of the 
given command as well as when dealing with protocols that perform authentication, 
the intrusion detection system collects trails both of the authenticator used for each 
session and the authenticator for malicious activity. SPA method uses protocol 
profiles according to the standards and any variations implemented by the vendor’s 
e.g. proprietary protocols which normally include incomplete specifications would 
cause inconvenience to the IDS in detecting and analyzing the states.  
 
Figure 13 Stateful protocol analysis [38] 
However stateful protocols analysis are not perfect as they have several drawbacks. 
Both complexity of the analysis and state tracking incorporating concurrent sessions 
are causing to be resource consuming. Moreover SPA are incapable of detecting 
attacks that do not violate the characteristics protocol behavior, that is to say recurrent 
legit actions in a specific time period to cause denial of service and also identification 
of possible conflicts between standards and the way that are implemented is 
impossible [49, 44].   
3.1.2.2.3 Statistical Anomaly Detection  
As DoS and DDoS attacks produce a blast of abnormal traffic, normal traffic profiles 
are created based on statistical methodologies (Naϊve Bayes) to detect anomalous 
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packets. Statistical modeling is based on estimating the probability value for each of 
the data packets that is considered normal traffic by using sampled data over a time 
frequency and stored in the normal profile that previously created. By the time the 
IDS is monitoring, the captured data are checked against the normal profile and a 
lower limit that is set for each group of protocols and users. An alert sets off when an 
abnormal packet is detected and the computed probability value is above the lower 
limit. Threshold can be defined for several profiles, protocols and users. Benefits of 
using statistical anomaly detection include: detection of unknown attacks, prevention 
of DoS attacks and buffer overflows. However the main drawback of this anomaly 
detection system is defining normal traffic while creating a baseline as normal traffic 
should be unaffected of any malicious activity over the network e.g. reconnaissance 
attacks. Also statistical anomaly systems are prone to false positives as well as longer 
time is spend in detection [44].   
3.2 Advance Persistent Threats vs Advance Volatile Threats 
An advanced persistent threat (APT) is developed to gain access to a network, 
acquire information and stealthily monitor the targeted system for a long period of 
time while an advanced volatile threat (AVT) uses a stealthier method vector when 
comparing to an APT, as it is an attack that points on memory only, meaning that no 
trails of the attack are available once the computer shut down. Even though advanced 
volatile threat is not a new defined threat as its existence as a malware for long time 
was widely known, it poses an extra caution for network systems. Mainly it is based 
on a drive-by download method and points RAM memory only making it a real time 
attack. AVTs are acting exactly the opposite way that an APT attack acts but there 
limitation is its existence which is no more than one day. A drive-by download 
technique is a loath download of malicious code unlikely without the need of the user 
as most cyber-attacks, that takes advantage of the targeted system applications, O/S or 
even web browser that contains security flaws. 
3.2.1 Fundamental components of an APT 
In order to decipher the full concept of an advanced persistent threat it is essential to 
dissever the term APT into its fundamental components reinforcing a definite number 
of clarifications around APTs [13].  
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Advanced: what qualifies a threat advanced is more their approach rather than the 
malcode that is consumed while in an APT burst. Additional a sufficient amount of 
these malwares overlap or exist as a part of a stealthy acted malware that is in full 
transmission.   
Some of the most multifaceted malwares are described in the Figure 14 APT 
classification [13] below including malformed binary based APT’s, variants, tools, 
utilities, frameworks and associated malware technologies.  
 
Figure 14 APT classification [13] 
In the world of APTs, the above mentioned bursts constitute the most versatile, 
outstanding and vital threats forming the term “advanced” deriving more from the 
outline and execution of campaign including the ability of the intruder to access the 
resources rather than the intelligence level of the code to be executed. Additional 
activities such as the inheritance of the intruder’s observation to its victim, the ethical 
social engineering techniques which are intended to divert and elude local defense 
systems, along with the consistent and stealthy approaches they utilize contribute to 
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the term of an advanced intimidation. An APT has the ability to disable the host 
machines from being tracked throughout the network with remote exploits and 
moreover to acquire credentials of the infected system effortlessly as mostly it cannot 
be identified with ease since it exists in stealthy mode (monitor and wait).  
Persistent: Persistency of an APT is the reason for causing most damage as most 
organizations will prevent and defend such attacks for a limited period of time, or 
until they feel that the threat has been eliminated, but that’s the most critical time for 
an intruder to act since the attacker will take advantage of the identified 
vulnerabilities of the system in both protocols and applications, turning the game to be 
both frustrating and exciting [9]. The destruction of solitary intruder activities is 
almost impossible to terminate the campaign, as a series of concurrently malformed 
activities will take place in order to accomplish their objective.  
Threat: Threat can be disastrous either for short-term profitability, or aims to 
destructive completely an organization or influencing its long-term success. 
Traditional threats which are more foreseeable on their target are typically an essence 
of gradation in contrast with APT threats that are stealthy and aiming on critical data 
and information, rather than unambiguous differences. Sometimes it is complicated to 
discern how advanced the adversary can be, even though they use exploits, rootkits, 
bots, Trojans or complementary malware to share or disseminate their emission. 
Since the term “advanced” does not rely upon intelligent technical skills, the main 
characteristics of an APT hacker focuses on: appropriate preparation, persistency in 
planning and exploiting, social omniscience, effectiveness, elegance, out-of-the-box 
thinking, utilization of exploitless exploits, extensively gathering of information and 
distractions [59]. 
 
Figure 15 APT-attack [4] 
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3.2.2 Behind the scenes of an Advance Persistent Threat 
The State Sponsored APT (SSAPT): constitutes several authoritative global military 
and intelligence organizations including air, space, sea, land and primarily 
cyberspace. Most intelligent agencies launch an asymmetric digital warfare to test 
their strength of digital defenses against advanced persistent threats [13, 9].  
The term “state” has many differences in international relations theory, from the terms 
country, nation and nation-state as these terms are used interchangeably. Additionally 
the term “nation-state” even though it sounds elegant it is different from term 
“country” in that many nation-states do not act on behalf of their people to protect 
their interests. The term “country” constitutes the people of the country while nation-
state is the organization controlling that country e.g. Taiwan and Hong Kong [50, 51] 
are currently their own nation-state but controlled under different country [13, 24].  
Nation-state actors are tracked utilizing well known indicators (normally kept private 
within relevant security firms or organizations), of compromise such as domain names 
(DGA) [8] and IP addresses that normally used in spy-phishing URL’s, post 
compromise for command-and-control (C2 or C&C), malware sample hashes or 
actor-specific detection rules such as YARA, Snort or Netwitness. Google is involved 
in many aspects of security research and threat intelligence collections in that many of 
these indicators can be accessible when appropriate. The majority of these indicators 
have the ability to detect both untargeted and targeted compromises that include a vast 
number of targets while just a few of them are able to detect well-crafted spear 
phishing by a nation-state actor [13, 9, 24].  
The Criminal APT (CAPT): Contradicting to non-state actors, techno-criminals are 
aiming to monetary attacks by utilizing several variants and autonomous techniques 
such as unlawful hacker-net, illicit Bitcoin networks, deep Dark-Nets, and TOR 
accumulating data by infecting targets. Nations may employ such agents in particular 
when needed their actors to be stealthy [13, 3]:   
o Individuals: Script Kiddies, Malware Authors , Scammers, Blackhats, 
Hacktivists, Patriotic Hackers 
o Corporations: Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, TASC, Raytheon 
o Cyber Terrorists 
o Autonomous actors: exploratory systems, attack systems, defensive systems 
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3.2.3 Advance Volatile Threat (AVT) 
In contradiction to an APT, advanced volatile threats are stealthier as they are 
designed that way to keep low profile, to be slow and persist in the network for very 
long time despite their limitations. An AVT also known as a fileless malware is one of 
the techniques that a malware uses in order to avoid analysis protecting that way the 
intruder’s identity. An easy exploitation tool that is included in the Metasploit 
Framework, allows developers to design their custom dll files that can be injected into 
a running process. Therefore no files are injected into the hard drive, as this technique 
aims only to process memory making it even more difficult to be detected [37, 13, 4].  
Additionally existing detecting strategies that incorporate signature detection, pattern-
analysis, and time stamping and other techniques are incapable of identifying such 
malware. However threat hunters utilize several anomaly based methods including 
statistical detection, density-based anomaly detection, clustering-based anomaly 
detection, machine-based anomaly and behavior anomaly detection techniques in 
order to identify and eliminate this kind of malware attacks [26]. However this is not a 
new malware, in fact it is an existing old malware with new term.  
Advanced volatile threat bursts predicate expertise in coding or evade, and hitherto 
AVT has been remarkably intermittent. As Figure 16 Fileless malware [21] below 
describes once the dll file is executed, disguise themselves in the pre-allocated RAM 
area, dissemble from anti-malware detection software and system administrators, and 
change to an actively socket from which the additional activities can be launched. 
Nowadays fileless techniques are a major component of every cybercrime and nation-
state group’s arsenal as it poses one of the most hazardous threats in every industry 
[39].   
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Figure 16 Fileless malware [21] 
3.2.3.1 Fileless Techniques 
The main fileless techniques that are used by many malware variations are divided 
into three categories [37]: 
• Windows registry manipulation: the fileless code is written and deployed 
directly from the registry by a normal Windows process, that way several 
advantages are achieved. 
• Memory code injection: the malware becomes an inherent part of the process 
memory, while several processes are executed by the system, that way it will 
transform its existence in many ways without being noticed by the system. 
Payload: includes paired tools (Netsh and PsExec), memory only tools (Mirai and 
DDoS) and non-PE file payloads (PowerShell scripts). 
3.2.3.2 Examples of Fileless command lines 
Ex.1: 
Malware name: Emotet [53] 
Executing process(es): “Cmd.exe” 
Fully\Partially deobfuscated command-lines: “set-item ('variable:skeail') ( [type]( 
'environment' ) ) ; ( .('ls') ('contextexecutionvariable') 
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).value.invokecommand.('invokescript' ).invoke( ( 
${skeail}::('getenvironmentvariable').invoke( 'diy',('process' ))))” 
 
Regular Expression for detection: 
“^(?=.*\bRuntIME\.InteroPsERvICEs\.marshAl\b)(?=.*\bGeTMEmbERS()\b)(?=.*\b
SeCureSTrINg\b)(?=.*\bTOStrIng\b)(?=.*\bjoIn\b).*$”  
 Ex.2: 
Malware name: Kovter [54] 
Executing process(es): “Mshta.exe”  
Malicious command-lines: 
“javascript:d7hcQ4a="vn";n0a=new%20ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell");Rtf7j="HI
Pc";X18ycI=n0a.RegRead("HKCU\\software\\tN32795\\74gjfzcsfI");jM5IV6m="QJ";
eval(X18ycI);XIaL0uze="lYuLz1vG"” 
Regular Expression for detection: 
“^(?=.*\bjavascript:\b)(?=.*\bWScript\.Shell\b)(?=.*\bRegRead\b)(?=.*
\beval\b).*$” 
Ex.3:  
Malware name: Phase Bot [34] 
Executing process(es): “Rundll32.exe” 
Malicious command lines: “javascript:”..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication 
“;eval((new%20ActiveXObject(“WScript.Shell”)).RegRead(“HKCUSoftwareMicroso
ftActive%20SetupInstalled%20Components{72507C54-3577-4830-815B-
310007F6135A}JavaScript”));close();” 
Regular Expression for detection: 
“^(?=.*\bjavascript\b)(?=.*\bRunHTMLApplication\b)(?=.*\bWScript\.Shell\b)(?=.*\
bRegRead\b)(?=.*\bHKCUSoftwareMicrosoftActive\b).*$” 
3.3 The Zeek platform 
Zeek is often described as an intrusion detection system which is neither wrong nor an 
accurate description. Alternatively it can be described as a development platform for 
network monitoring applications. It is equipped with a substantial out-of-the-box 
functionality for decoding and logging network traffic and provides an event-driven 
development model that allows to identify certain types of transactions as well as a 
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highly stateful Domain Specific Language (DSL) for developing custom scripts and 
deploy them when needed. Zeek’s scripting language that is also called “Zeek” offers 
several features that are extraordinarily beneficial for protocol analysis. Zeek differs 
from a signature-based IDS system like Snort or Suricata even though it can be used 
as a complementary approach. It is often the best option regarding complex tasks, like 
the ones that require high-level protocol knowledge and understanding, multiple 
cross-network flows or using custom algorithm to identify a specific malicious 
activity in the traffic. One of its main benefits is that it inherently is aware of all of the 
common and uncommon network protocols, even if they are exposed on non-standard 
ports, by utilizing one its features called Dynamic Protocol Detection (DPD). Some of 
the supported application and tunneling protocols are: DHCP, DNS, FTP, SMTP, 
SOCKS, SSH, SSL, GTPv1 and others [48, 20].    
 
Figure 17 Zeek architecture [7] 
Zeek has been chosen for its benefits in analyzing in depth, because it is an open-
source popular tool and it is widely used by security experts. As Figure 17 Zeek 
architecture [7] above describes Zeek consists of 3 main parts [7]:  
• Packet processing layer:  
o Required knowledge of higher layers 
o Can be both hardware and software 
o Passes data to upper layers depending the configuration (policy) 
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o In most instances current layer represent an external device or software 
stack 
• Event engine (Zeek Core):  
o Dynamic Protocol Detection (DPD) 
o Generates “Events” to be processed 
• Policy script interpreter: 
o Acts on Events 
o Zeek stateful Domain Specific Language 
o Pre-build frameworks and protocol analyzers 
o Is included in basic policies that provide logging 
Also Zeek is capable of supporting larger networks as Figure 18 Zeek Clustering [7] 
below describes. Packet processing layer allocates the data in order for the load to be 
distributed to worker nodes. This way smaller stream of data are consumed, 
eliminating high load. The several tools and scripts that come along with Zeek 
provide the framework to deal with multiple Zeek processes, including examination of 
packets and correlation activities, while acting as single entity [15].   
 
Figure 18 Zeek Clustering [7] 
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Figure 19 Zeek SSL Protocol analyzer [60] 
Network traffic that uses an application protocol is logged automatically by Zeek, 
treating the actions taken by the protocol as a series of events, while several 
mechanisms for creating custom scripts are available. Security expert also have the 
ability to use multiple custom scripts for the same event while the same protocol is 
inspected for various types of behavior [48]. 
3.3.1 Zeek Administration 
ZeekControl is a handy interactive shell as it is described in Figure 20 ZeekControl shell 
that is used to configure and manage the entire Zeek framework. ZeekControl helps in 
achieving several tasks including: Start an instance of Zeek and check whether is 
executing, activate nodes and interfaces, packet statistics, list all Zeek active 
processes, identify type of current Zeek instance, stop Zeek and exit ZeekControl 
[18]. 
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Figure 20 ZeekControl shell 
Moreover from Zeekctl.log email option can be specified as it can be seen from Figure 
21 ZeekControl configuration file.  
 
Figure 21 ZeekControl configuration file 
3.3.2 Log Files 
Logs are accessible via path /nsm/Zeek/current/ in a human readable format (ASCII) 
and captured data are organized in columns. Several log files are included in the 
directory some of them are: 
• http.log : contains results of Zeek HTTP protocol analysis 
• Conn.log: contains data for every connection identified through the wire. This 
log provides a complete memo of the network’s activity. 
• Notice.log: contains specific activities that identified to be possible interesting.  
• Loaded_scripts.log: contains all the Zeek scripts loaded during startup. 
 47 
Other logs are also created during run time, including logs on protocol and services 
specific: 
• Conn-summary.log: including post processing connection summaries 
• Communications.log: including data between remote and central instances 
• Known_hosts.log:  including hosts successful TCP handshakes. 
• Reporter.log: containing warnings and errors 
• Dns.log: containing DNS queries 
• Software.log: containing known and identified software detected from 
protocol analyzers. 
• Weird.log: containing odd protocol behavior 
 
Figure 22 Loaded scripts log 
A full list of Zeek logs can be found in Appendix A. 
3.3.3 Zeek Scripting Language 
Zeek scripting language is an asset of Zeek platform as its functionality can be 
customized depending the organization needs. It is an extensive scripting language 
that is both flexible and powerful while notice policies issue notifications upon an 
event that need specific actions to be taken such as alerting to the SIEM framework.    
Zeek scripting language supports the following data types: 
 
Name Description 
bool Boolean 
count, int, double Numeric types 
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time, interval Time types 
string String 
pattern Regular expression 
port, addr, subnet Network types 
enum Enumeration (user-defined type) 
table, set, vector, record Container types 
function, event, hook Executable types 
file File type (only for writing) 
opaque Opaque type (for some built-in functions) 
any Any type (for functions or containers) 
Table 2 Data types 
Some worth mentioning operators include the following: 
Name Syntax Notes 
Exact matching p == s 
Evaluates to a boolean, 
indicating if the entire string 
exactly matches the pattern. 
Embedded matching p in s 
Evaluates to a boolean, 
indicating if pattern is found 
somewhere in the string. 
Conjunction p1 & p2 
Evaluates to a pattern that 
represents matching p1 
followed by p2. 
Disjunction p1 | p2 Evaluates to a pattern that represents matching p1 or p2. 
Table 3 Pattern operators 
The ‘as’ operator performs type casting, while the ‘is’ operator checks whether a type 
cast is supported or not. For both operators, the first operand identifies the value and 
the second operand is the name of a Zeek script type.  
Name Syntax Notes 
Type cast v as t 
Cast value “v” into type “t”. 
Evaluates to the value 
casted to the specified type. 
If this is not a supported 
cast, then a runtime error is 
triggered. 
Check if a cast is supported v is t 
Evaluates to boolean. If 
true, then “v as t” would 
succeed. 
Table 4 Type casting operator 
As an example Figure 23 Type casting example below, the function tries to cast a value 
to a string: 
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Figure 23 Type casting example 
3.3.3.1 Monitoring traffic use cases 
Zeek’s ability is to detect the any protocol from the network traffic either live traffic 
or captured events that will be used for analysis and auditing purposes [17].  
• Proxy server: is configured that way to request services on behalf of third 
systems, such as a Web server. Proxies were designed with the aim to manage 
a network and provide better encapsulation. Proxies are declared as threats 
when lack of proper configuration, as they can ease compromised by intruders 
in order to conduct malicious activities.  
 
Figure 24 Proxy GET request and reply 
Then a Zeek in script language can be composed to handle such requests like 
the example in Figure 25 http_proxy.Zeek script. The script checks for a “200 
OK” and other replies as well since not only “200 OK” is a success status 
code. Lines 1 and 3 are simply used to declare that proxy is part of the local 
network. A common entry in Zeek scripts is the “redef” operator, which 
allows to add a value on an already defined variable. Line 2 allows to generate 
an alert when an open proxy has been detected while a new notification has 
been defined (lines 10-12) to alert all tagged communications. 
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Figure 25 http_proxy.Zeek script 
Executing http_proxy.Zeek will produce a notice.log as it can be seen in 
Figure 26 http proxy output while an e-mail can also be sent if configured.   
 
Figure 26 http proxy output 
 
• File inspection: Zeek is also able to monitor files that are transmitted through 
the network, as most of these files turn to be malicious, normally image files, 
but other than that has the ability to monitor also executable files, which are 
really dangerous for the system. 
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Figure 27 File extraction 
In lines 1-7 the created table serves two purposes, firstly defines the mime 
types to extract and secondly defines the file suffix of the extracted files. In 
order to keep this script general and monitor files other than HTTP protocol 
behavior, the first conditional (fa_file) in the event handler can be removed.  
   
 
Figure 28 File inspection execution 
3.3.3.2 Detecting attacks and notification 
Zeek can be configured to act like a normal IDS in order to detect attacks with well-
known patterns, as well as unknown patterns due to its programming capabilities. 
Additionally custom scripts can me designed that meet organization needs. As it is 
described in Figure 29 Detect FTP Bruteforcing below, a host bruteforcing FTP is 
indicated by monitoring several rejected username of passwords. Following there is a 
threshold definition for the number of unsuccessful attempts, a monitoring interval 
and a new notice type.   
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Figure 29 Detect FTP Bruteforcing 
The “ftp_reply” event is then used to check the error codes from the 500 event series 
from the FTP (Permanent Negative Completion reply) both for “USER” and “PASS” 
that represent rejected usernames and password. In order for this to be achieved the 
following function “FTP::parse_ftp_reply_code” is used, breaking down the reply 
code, while checking if the first digit has the value “5”, where if it true the summary 
statistics framework is used to keep the number of failed attempts.  
 
Figure 30 FTP bruteforcing reply event 
As it can be seen in Figure 31 SumStats Framework below, the statistics framework 
raises a notice of the attack when the number of unsuccessful attempts exceeds the 
previously specified threshold.  
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Figure 31 SumStats Framework 
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4 Deploying Network Security Policy into an IDS 
Nowadays networks and communications became even more complex, while many 
corporations concern about their reputation against sophisticated attacks. Dissatisfied 
employees, unethical corporations, terrorists or even nations utilize the internet as a 
portal in order to acquire sensitive data and to compel both economic and political 
upheavals. We are constantly intimidated with cyber events news: cybercrime is 
grown, update your antivirus to avoid infections, new 0-day attack against 
smartphones and social media compromisations. Whether the motivation of 
cybercriminals are money or intellectual property, cyber threats have become more 
sophisticated either by stealthily monitoring the target system or pointing to RAM 
memory only. So there is a major need in making security today to be good. There are 
several solution provided for this cause, one of them is an IDS, and the other one is a 
combination of a network security policy with an IDS that is designed in Zeek in 
order to detect threats and intrusions based on an anomaly detection mechanism.  
This system will be deployed under a university network environment, monitoring 
live traffic and identify any possible anomalies.  
We are aiming to analyze these anomalies and develop patterns that will lead us to 
design efficient and effective Zeek modules for a variety network traffic protocols and 
applications. We are interesting in the following protocols and applications as part of 
IHU university network security policy: 
• Basic authentication and authentication through VPN connections 
• Detection of Exploitkit and C&C behavior 
• Malware detection  
• Extract and Hash Files 
• ICMP Tunnel Attack 
• Detection of Large Files transfer through the cable 
• Logging of ARP Requests/Replies 
• HTTP User Agent detection 
• Track of SSH sessions 
• Tunnel Attack 
• UDP Scans and active response 
• Detection of Unknown services on Known Ports 
IHU university network security policy will be translates to Zeek scripting language 
in order to detect anomalies through the network. 
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5 Security policy implementation and APT identification 
5.1 Hierarchy of Policy scripts in Zeek platform 
The hierarchy of produced scripts by default is under the following two paths 
“/usr/local/Zeek/policy” or “/usr/local/Zeek/site”. The policy scripts are implemented 
using Zeek Scripting Language, a powerfull DSL.  
Several Wireshark files have been produced in order to cover as much as possible the 
IHU Security Policy. These captures files where created with Wireshark under certain 
traffic circumstances. In order to test the policy scenarios with captured files the 
following command syntax followed:  
“Zeek –r tracefile scriptfile.Zeek” 
In cases where these implemented scripts will be used for real situation, under live 
network traffic the following syntax is used: 
“Zeek –i scriptfile.Zeek” 
5.1.1 Basic authentication and authentication through VPN connections 
A simple approach on identifying basic Login/Logout authentication of users 
connected to the network, as well as authentication of users that are connected 
through VPN (Radius) connections. All authentication activities are logged into files, 
and for the one we are interested a notice is raised.  
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Figure 32 Basic authentication sample code 
For first time logged in users the system will save its IP address and username, but for 
existing users it will check whether the host address is on the list with authenticated 
IP addresses. As Figure 33 below describes, we can see the users logged in or out 
defined by their names along with action (Login, Logout) and the service used.  
 
Figure 33 Basic authentication log 
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Figure 34 Log VPN authentication activity 
Additional fields have been added to the Radius log file for identifying VLAN 
activity. As it is described above in Figure 34 the script controls this activity by 
identifying whether the connected user is legit or not, if its IP address and country 
code are known, or whether remote country code exists in the list of watched 
countries. The script also includes a functionality of identifying the country code 
based of the detected IP. For simplicity reasons this is achieved through a set of 
predefined strings and not through the GeoIP mechanism, which demands connection 
to a database but also other useful information about the host are provided (city, 
latitude, longitude). 
 
Figure 35 VPN authentication activity output 
5.1.2 Detection of Exploit kit and C&C behavior  
The following Zeek script is looking for exploit kits and C&C behavior that is hidden 
in files. More precisely files like Java Applet, MS Word documents, XML and PDF 
files are more vulnerable to be infected through their functionality e.g. Microsoft 
Word documents that use macros in order to activate extended functionalities of the 
 58 
document. The detection is achieved through tracking the source IP by using patterns 
that indicate dynamic content.  
 
Figure 36 Sniffing files with a predefined pattern 
In this script, we are using content pattern mechanism in order to identify extended 
functionality of a detected document, whether that is a pdf, a word document or an 
executable as it is shown in Figure 38 below, that an xml file identified using the 
highlighted pattern. Such files belong to a particular class of file types identified by 
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME). Several scans of the identified files 
take place such as: whether found file belongs to a set of predefined executable file 
types or it is part of a set of exploit file types as it is described above in Figure 36.  
 
Figure 37 Identified 2 infected XML files 
 
 59 
 
Figure 38 Matched XML file 
For each of these files identified a notice is raised up clarifying its file activity, originating 
and destination host/port and the protocol used.  
 
Figure 39 Raised Notices upon detection of malicious downloads 
5.1.3 Malware detection 
The following script detects malware that their hash keys include sha256 and md5 
values against files in Cymru's Team Malware Hash Registry. 
We use a list of file types to be matched against the Malware Hash Registry as shown 
in Figure 40 below. 
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Figure 40 File types to be checked 
The list can be appended by adding alternative file types which considered to be 
important for matching against the Malware Hash Registry as it is re-definable.  
 
Figure 41 Malware detected 
This script uses a similar technique with the method used in Chap. 5.1.4 regarding the 
mime type’s declaration but in a different pattern, as the above mentioned mimes are 
checked against a Malware Hash Registry database (Cymru’s).  
The heart of this malware detection script is located under event handler “file-hash” 
as it is described in Figure 42 below. By using this event, scripts can retrieve 
associated information of a file, that previously file analysis framework provided by 
Zeek has generated a hash.  
 
Figure 42 File hash event handler 
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This event contains a mechanism that identifies the correct type of hash, in our case 
hashes SHA256 and MD5 along with a check for a mime type previously defined in 
“match_file_types” constant. This comparison is achieved against the expression 
“f$info$mime_type” by using the “$” deference operator in order to check the match 
of the value “mime_type” that is stored inside “f$info”. Thereafter another check is 
included in order to observe if this hash value is not included in the “know_hashes” 
values. In case this expression evaluates to be true, the new hash value it is added to 
the list of “known_hashes” for feature identification and a notice is fired stating that a 
malware hash detected. On the other hand if the above expression is false then another 
notice is produced stating that this hash has been seen before.  
 
Figure 43 Malware extended information 
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Figure 44 Large application/x-dosexec mime type detected 
5.1.4 Extract and Hash Files 
The following script is designed to detect and hash several files identified through 
network. Extracted files are marked as “.EXTRACTED”.  
The list of files is re-definable and any type of file can be added whether need to 
extracted and hashed depending the requirements of its IDS system, as it is shown in 
Figure 45 below. 
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Figure 45 Files types to be extracted and hashed 
Several files are often transmitted over packet transactions throughout a client and a 
server. In our script we use a detection method of identifying malformed files that are 
transmitted through an HTTP communication session. Nevertheless the same script 
can be used for other protocols as well. These files sometimes are prone to be 
dangerous for a system and especially executable files or files with active content 
such as java scripts, word document or excel sheets with macros enabled, pdf files, 
images with hidden content etc. As it is described above in Figure 45, this table of 
mime type’s benefits two functions, firstly to declare the mime types to be extracted 
and secondly the suffix of these extracted files.  
 
Figure 46 Extracted and hashed files types 
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Figure 47 More Extracted and hashed file types 
 
Figure 48 Extracted file format type 
As it can be seen from Figure 48 above, the script detected an "application/x-
dosexec" mime_type that was first defined in the list of files types, hashed the file 
with values md5, sha1 and sha256 values and stored the file in the parent directory 
with “name.EXTRACTED” format. 
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5.1.5 ICMP Tunnel attack 
Another way of tunnel attack is presented in this script. Upon detection of ICMP 
Tunnel session a notice will be raised.  
 
Figure 49 ICMP Tunnel observer will raise a notice above a threshold 
This type of tunneling is used regularly in order to bypass firewall rules and it’s in-
dependable of design that makes it to be classified as an encrypted communication 
channel between two hosts. In order for us to successfully observe ICMP tunneling, 
we use the summary statistics framework provided by Zeek platform. To be more 
precise in our results we use the “HyperLogLog algorithm” that is able to calculate 
the number of unique values in a list. 
 
Figure 50 ICMP Tunnel detected 
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Figure 51 An alarm notice is raised 
5.1.6 Detection of large file transfer through the cable 
Large file transport is always an issue, especially for corporation and universities, as it 
consumes network bandwidth. This script is designed to detect large transfer of files 
throughout a network and drop the originating host for 20 seconds.  
 
Figure 52 Notice will be raised when a predefined will be crossed 
On detection of large file through the wire a notice is fired providing several useful 
information to the security officer as Figure 55 below presents. Again a large file 
intends to be any file that is over a predefined amount of Mbyte’s resulting the 
connection of the initiated host to be dropped for a certain period of time that is in our 
case for 20 secs. 
 67 
 
Figure 53 Source address is dropped 
 
 
Figure 54 A notice is raised for Large Transfer 
 
 
Figure 55 Large transfer of file detected 
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Figure 56 Originating host 192.168.1.104 is dropped for 20 seconds 
5.1.7 Logging ARP requests and replies 
This is script is designed that way to keep a log of all the ARP Protocol requests and 
replies that identified to be appear in network traffic. 
 
Figure 57 ARP protocol requests and replies log 
The construction of an ARP protocol request contains fields such as timestamp, the 
method of the request either “request” or “reply”, MAC address, originating and 
target hardware addresses along with their port numbers. All ARP requests and replies 
are stored in a log file and presented in a more readable way as Figure 58 below 
shows. 
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Figure 58 Output log of the ARP requests and replies 
5.1.8 HTTP user agent detection 
Among several ways that have been used in the past to identify either malware of 
unlicensed software, this script observes user agents throughout a network traffic by 
using Zeek summary statistics framework. 
 
Figure 59 Connection unsuccessful attempts 
 
 70 
 
Figure 60 HTTP agent detected 
An HTTP agent has been detected clarifying the observation of unsuccessful 
connection attempts. The raised notice contains the source IP address of the 
discovered agent together with the number of attempted connections as it is described 
above in Figure 60. 
5.1.9 Detect SSH sessions 
A simple approach of identifying both successful and failed SSH sessions. The script 
also prints out the client and server version strings along with the number of failed 
sessions.  
 71 
 
Figure 61 Detection of SSH sessions 
Each time that a successful SSH session or a non-local host connects through SSH is 
identified a notice is raised, determining the originating host, the SSH versions and 
the number of attempts either successful or failed against a predefined set of allowed 
IP addresses as it is described in Figure 62.  
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Figure 62 SSH authentication printout 
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Figure 63 An extensive option added to the script 
5.1.10 Tunnel attack 
Yet another script is designed aiming to detect DNS tunneling by checking the 
abnormal behavior of packets and query lengths. As an extended feature of this 
detection mechanism is the ability of identification of C&C DNS Tunneling software. 
Since a Tunnel attack is identified the connection initiator IP address is dropped for a 
small period of time.  
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Figure 64 DNS tunneling observer 
Summary statistics framework is used in order to observe tunneling sessions. This 
scripts supports both an observation of packet abnormality and query lengths as 
Figure 64 and Figure 65 show. Zeek gives us the opportunity to predefine several 
characteristics concerning the queries in order to acquire more accurate results such as 
the ability to identify which DNS queries we want to exclude, the size of the DNS 
query that is considered interesting, the identification of query types that we need to 
ignore (Netbios service, DNSSEC delegation signer, etc.) and others. 
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Figure 65 C&C DNS Tunneling software observer 
 
Figure 66 DNS tunnel 
Identification of a tunneling session contains among other, critical information about 
the attacking host (originating host address and port), the destination host, the 
protocol used along with the actual contents of the query pattern e.g. xe3.pirate.sea. 
Such a connection is observed the connection initiator IP address is dropped for a 
certain period of time.  
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Figure 67 Query includes .pirate.sea pattern detected 
 
 
Figure 68 Identified host is dropped for a small period of time 
 
5.1.11 UDP scans and active response 
This script is designed in order to detect UDP address scans, UDP port scans as well 
as random UDP scans. Once a UDP scan is detected the host will be automatically be 
blocked.  
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Figure 69 Types of notices to be raised once a UDP scan is identified 
As it is clearly stated in Figure 69, certain types of scans are predefined for which a 
notice will be generated when an attack is attempted. Any of these notices will be 
fired, the attacking host will be blocked. More precisely summary statistics 
framework is been used for such situations providing summarization of large streams 
of data into reduced measurements.  
 
Figure 70 UDP port failure observer 
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Figure 71 Block of the identified host once a UDP scan is detected 
The notices produced by the script, contain critical information of source and 
destination IP address along with a mechanism of counting the attacking attempts to a 
destination host against a given threshold as it is described in Figure 74 below. 
Additionally a UDP call back functionality is supported identifying the current state 
of a UDP connection as it is shown in Figure 72 below.  
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Figure 72 Support of callback functionality based on UDP behavior  
 
Figure 73 Port scan detected 
 
 80 
 
Figure 74 Originating host scanned 15 UDP ports of 192.168.1.25 
5.1.12 Detection of unknown services on known ports 
An approach of detecting anomalous traffic over a network by identifying hosts that 
try to connect on a non-default port to FTP or SSH applications.  
 
Figure 75 Sets of default ports 
 
As it is described above in Figure 75 several sets of ports (TCP/UDP, FTP, SSH) are 
predefined in order to obtain a more precise detection of unknown services. Other 
ports can also be predefined, but that’s dependent the requirements of the IDS to be 
developed.   
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Figure 76 Detection mechanism 
Whenever an unknown service is identified, certain events will be triggered from the 
script and the security officer will be notified with a Notice that contains the type of 
the unknown service in regards to FTP or SSH server, the host originated the issue as 
well as the destination host, originating port/destination port, the protocol that this 
unknown service has used as it is described in Figure 78 and Figure 79 below.  
 
Figure 77 Unknown services spotted through network traffic 
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Figure 78 Host identified to connect on a non-default SSH port 
 
 
Figure 79 Host captured while trying to connect on a non-default FTP port 
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6 Conclusions 
Intrusion detection systems tend to be a main factor of internet security in the last few 
years as their functionality intention is not to replace existing security measurements 
but to advance them. Although intrusion detection systems play a vital role in cyber 
security, also other precautions have to be taken into account, such as starting from the 
bottom of basic computer and network security issues (e.g. credit cards exposure over 
the network, exposure of personal sensitive information) to more complex tasks such 
as correct firewall settings, licensed software, regular backups or even more complex 
passwords.  
We should keep in mind that intrusion detection systems are not autonomous systems, 
and are not suitable for all kinds of organizations either governmental or commercially 
used, but are tools that use domain specific languages like Zeek that must be interpret 
it by security experts in order to acquire the knowledge of an attack and perform the 
appropriate measures in order to prevent system compromisation in the future. 
Cybercrime is no longer the entitlement of lone wolves or script kiddies rather than is 
a portal for unethical corporations, cyberterrorists or even disgruntled employees to 
gather sensitive data information in order to cause economic or political disruption.  
Serving this purpose Zeek IDS tends to be the most popular, efficient and effective 
anomaly-detection system which can be used out there.  
This thesis is used to describe the functionality of implemented Zeek scripts that are 
based on rules of a university network security policy. We have presented several 
network intrusion scenarios in order to cover the most out of the IHU network security 
policy such as basic authentication, authentication rule while connected to a VPN 
server, detection of exploit kits and C&C application behavior, malware detection, 
extraction and hashing of files over a network traffic, detection of large files that are 
transferred through a network, active response on UDP scan, detection of unknown 
services while trying to connect on known ports, tunnel attacks, tracking of SSH 
sessions as well as identification and detection of HTTP user agents that normally hide 
inside regular files like Microsoft word documents (hidden macros). 
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6.1 Future implementations  
Present thesis work consists only one module among a variety of modules that already 
exist. Anomaly-based detection method could be implemented along with signature-
based systems for more accurate results. Since Zeek scripting language is tailored based 
on the security system needs also further frameworks could be designed supporting the 
execution of commands to its identified host that poses abnormal behavior. 
Furthermore an organization security policy could be “translated” into Zeek language, 
where more advanced policies may be incorporated with other security systems. 
Moreover it could be handy a security policy that identifies attached devices to a host 
and can be detected over the network based on the protocols that are transmitted.       
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7 Appendix A: Zeek Log Files 
Source: https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/script-reference/log-files.html 
Table 5 Network Protocols 
Log File Description 
conn.log TCP/UDP/ICMP connections 
dce_rpc.log Distributed Computing Environment/RPC 
dhcp.log DHCP leases 
dnp3.log DNP3 requests and replies 
dns.log DNS activity 
ftp.log FTP activity 
http.log HTTP requests and replies 
irc.log IRC commands and responses 
kerberos.log Kerberos 
modbus.log Modbus commands and responses 
modbus_register_change.log Tracks changes to Modbus holding registers 
mysql.log MySQL 
ntlm.log NT LAN Manager (NTLM) 
radius.log RADIUS authentication attempts 
rdp.log RDP 
rfb.log Remote Framebuffer (RFB) 
sip.log SIP 
smb_cmd.log SMB commands 
smb_files.log SMB files 
smb_mapping.log SMB trees 
smtp.log SMTP transactions 
snmp.log SNMP messages 
socks.log SOCKS proxy requests 
ssh.log SSH connections 
ssl.log SSL/TLS handshake info 
syslog.log Syslog messages 
tunnel.log Tunneling protocol events 
 
Table 6 Files 
Log File Description 
files.log File analysis results 
ocsp.log Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Only created if policy script is loaded. 
pe.log Portable Executable (PE) 
x509.log X.509 certificate info 
 
Table 7 Detection 
Log File Description 
intel.log Intelligence data matches 
notice.log Zeek notices 
notice_alarm.log The alarm stream 
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signatures.log Signature matches 
traceroute.log Traceroute detection 
 
Table 8 Network Observations 
Log File Description 
known_certs.log SSL certificates 
known_hosts.log Hosts that have completed TCP handshakes 
known_modbus.log Modbus masters and slaves 
known_services.log Services running on hosts 
software.log Software being used on the network 
 
Table 9 Zeek Diagnostics 
Log File Description 
broker.log Peering status events between Zeek or Broker-enabled processes 
capture_loss.log Packet loss rate 
cluster.log Zeek cluster messages 
config.log Configuration option changes 
loaded_scripts.log Shows all scripts loaded by Zeek 
packet_filter.log List packet filters that were applied 
prof.log Profiling statistics (to create this log, load policy/misc/profiling.Zeek) 
reporter.log Internal error/warning/info messages 
stats.log Memory/event/packet/lag statistics 
stderr.log Captures standard error when Zeek is started from ZeekControl 
stdout.log Captures standard output when Zeek is started from ZeekControl 
 
Table 10 Miscellaneous 
Log File Description  
barnyard2.log Alerts received from Barnyard2 
 
dpd.log Dynamic protocol detection failures 
 
unified2.log Interprets Snort’s unified output 
 
weird.log Unexpected network-level activity 
 
weird_stats.log Statistics about unexpected activity 
 
 
8 Appendix B: Zeek Policy Scripts 
Table 11 Zeek Script names along with PCAP files used 
Script Name & File Pcap File Reference PCAP file info 
Basic-Auth_and_VPN-
Auth.zeek 
Basic-Auth_and_VPN-Auth.zeek  
 
RADIUS_authentication.vnd.tcpdump.7z
 
radius_localhost.7z  
nb6-hotspot.7z  
• RADIUS_authentication.vnd.tcpdump.
pcap 
(https://networker.fandom.com/wiki/Fil
e:RADIUS_authentication.pcap ) 
• radius_localhost.pcapng 
(https://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCapt
ures?action=AttachFile&do=get&target
=radius_localhost.pcapng ) 
• nb6-hotspot.pcap 
(https://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCapt
ures?action=AttachFile&do=get&target
=nb6-hotspot.pcap ) 
 
• Contains Radius packets of access-
request, accept and reject.  
• This file contains RADIUS packets 
sent from localhost to localhost, using 
FreeRADIUS Server and the radtest 
utility.  
• Contains information about a user that 
is connecting to SFRs wireless 
community network 
CandCkit.zeek 
CandCkit.zeek  
pdf.7z  
exercise_traffic.7z  
• pdf.pcap 
(https://github.com/hosom/bro-
scripts/blob/master/pdf.pcap ) 
• exercise_traffic.pcap 
(https://github.com/zeek/try-
zeek/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/
exercise_traffic.pcap ) 
• Contains PDF file transmission over 
the wire.  
• Contains normal traffic scenario and 
includes malformed files over the 
wire. 
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Check-for-Malware.zeek 
Check-for-Malware.zeek  
FileExtraction-faf-exercise.7
 
 
• FileExtraction-faf-exercise.pcap 
(https://www.bro.org/static/exchange-
2013/faf-exercise.pcap ) 
• A traffic capture used for integrating 
the File Analysis Framework 
Extracting_And_Hash_Fi
le_Types.zeek 
Extracting_And_Hash_File_Types.zeek  
exercise_traffic.7z  
exercise_traffic.pcap 
(https://github.com/zeek/try-
zeek/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/exe
rcise_traffic.pcap ) 
• Contains normal traffic scenario and 
includes malformed files over the 
wire. 
ICMP_Tunnel_Attack.ze
ek 
ICMP_Tunnel_Attack.zeek
 
icmptunnel.7z  
 
icmptunnel.pcap 
(https://packettotal.com/app/analysis?id=c3
7c0d3084675ed9b9d63a4e5e50e8da&nam
e=signature_alerts ) 
• ET TROJAN OpenSSH in ICMP Payload 
Large_transfer_detected.
zeek 
Large_transfer_detected.zeek
 
exercise_traffic.7z  
exercise_traffic.pcap 
(https://github.com/zeek/try-
zeek/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/exe
rcise_traffic.pcap ) 
• Contains normal traffic scenario and 
includes malformed files over the 
wire. 
Logging_ARP_Requests
_Replies.zeek exercise_traffic.7z  
exercise_traffic.pcap 
(https://github.com/zeek/try-
zeek/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/exe
rcise_traffic.pcap ) 
• Contains normal traffic scenario and 
includes malformed files over the 
wire. 
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Logging_ARP_Requests_Replies.zeek  
HTTP-user-agent.zeek 
HTTP-user-agent.zeek  
nmap-vsn.7z  
nmap-vsn.trace 
(https://github.com/zeek/zeek/blob/master/t
esting/btest/Traces/nmap-vsn.trace ) 
• A trace file of a host that runs NMAP 
SSH_Track.zeek 
SSH_Track.zeek  
ssh.7z  
ssh.pcap (https://github.com/bro/try-
bro/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/ssh.p
cap )  
• Successful and failed SSH sessions 
Tunnel-Attack.zeek 
Tunnel-Attack.zeek  
dns-tunnel-iodine.7z  
dns-tunnel-iodine.pcap 
(https://github.com/elastic/examples/raw/m
aster/Security%20Analytics/dns_tunnel_de
tection/dns-tunnel-iodine.pcap ) 
• DNS Tunneling traffic scenario 
UDP-Scan-And-Active-
Response.zeek 
UDP-Scan-And-Active-Response.zeek  
SCAN_nmap_UDP_SCAN_EvilFingers.7z
 
SCAN_nmap_UDP_SCAN_EvilFingers.pc
ap (http://www.pcapanalysis.com/pcap-
download/460 ) 
• NMAP UDP Scan Network Traffic 
Scenario 
Unknown-service-on-
known-port.zeek 
Unknown-service-on-known-port.zeek  
 
exercise_traffic.7z  
exercise_traffic.pcap 
(https://github.com/zeek/try-
zeek/blob/master/manager/static/pcaps/exe
rcise_traffic.pcap ) 
• Contains normal traffic scenario and 
includes malformed files over the 
wire. 
 
9 Appendix C: IHU Network Security Policy 
IHU-Network-SecPo
licy--Finaal.docx  
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